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Supporting the willingness of Ukraine, Romania and the Republic of Moldova (RM) to 
promote the values of freedom and democracy within the area from the Baltic to the Caspian 
Sea; 
Considering that the EU and NATO are actors in the region and that the option of the 
countries in the region - including Ukraine and Moldova – is to move towards the common 
European and Euro-Atlantic space; 
Stressing the importance of the Transnistrian settlement for further strengthening and 
consolidating of the above-mentioned space, as well as for regional security and stability; 
Deeply regretting that all the previous attempts of conflict resolution have so far failed; 
Recalling OSCE Istanbul commitments taken by Russia as a precondition for ratification of 
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty; 
Admitting that Ukraine, Romania and the Republic of Moldova face the same threats and 
risks generated by the conflict in Transnistria, and thus have a common interest in promoting 
and applying a common solution; 
Stressing that the three countries should develop a joint framework of assumed commitments 
for promoting such a solution; 
Stressing that all the tools and instruments of the three regional actors – state bodies as well 
as civil society actors – should be put together, with generosity, and with added values 
offered by other countries, in order to produce the specific, correct and sustainable solution 
for the Transnistrian problem; 
Welcoming all international organisations to be deeper involved in the process where they 
can contribute added value to it; 
Promoting together this common project by all means, at the level of international 
institutions, particularly NATO and the EU, and in relations with the USA and Russia; 
Being convinced that the solution offered by the regional trilateral efforts should get the 
support and involvement of the EU, NATO, the USA, and Russia; 
Recognising that the basis of the solution lies in the advanced democratisation of the entire 
Republic of Moldova, because for a successful and complete integration of its Eastern region 
a functional democracy in full compliance with the European criteria is needed in the 
Republic of Moldova as a whole; 
Considering recent international and regional political developments and changes as a 
window of opportunity for solving this crisis.  
PRESENTS to national governments, international organisations, national and international 
NGOs and expert community the Policy Paper and Recommendations below.  
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I. Transnistrian Conflict – Overview 
 
Before the eventual demise of the USSR Moscow made many attempts to prevent such an 
outcome. Among them, separatist conflicts between the majority populations of the then 
Soviet republics, which were becoming progressively oriented on state independence, and 
minority groups compactly living in certain areas, were regarded as a potent tool (based on 
the well-known imperial tactic of “divide and rule”).  Four of these conflicts (in Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh and the eastern-most area of Moldova) remain unresolved 
to date and therefore, are now called “frozen conflicts”. One of them (although differing from 
the three others in several important respects) – that on the territory of the Moldovan Soviet 
Socialist Republic – developed in its “weakest point”, now known as Transnistria. During  
the turbulent times of “perestroika”, this particular region, hosting an important part of soviet 
military-industrial complex, was one of the first to serve as a testing area for constructing a 
local conflict, aimed at preventing Moldova’s full-fledged independence from the USSR and 
general collapse of Soviet Empire. The presence of the Russian 14
th
 Army, also of arsenals 
and weapons moved to Transnistria from Germany and Czechoslovakia, provided additional 
argument for Russia to keep the region under its own control. 
 
As a result of these developments, the population of the Eastern districts of the Republic of 
Moldova passed from one totalitarian regime to another – separatist and repressive one. Short 
but violent and bloody conflict in between left its traumatic imprint on people’s mind. 
 
Transnistria – the term often used nowadays – is a narrow strip of land in the eastern-most 
region of the Republic of Moldova, located along a major part of the Ukrainian-Moldovan 
border (452 km. from 1222 km.). This heavily industrialised region, with well-developed 
enterprises of Soviet military-industrial complex, has been populated by the same ethnic 
groups as the rest of Moldova, although local Russians and Ukrainians, taken together, 
outnumber ethnic Moldovans/Romanians. Such a situation developed over the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
centuries as a result of shifting post-wars borders between Russia (during Soviet times – the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), and Romania, also due to the Soviet policy of migration 
from the other parts of the USSR to the Republic of Moldova to provide a working force for 
military plants and other heavy industries.   
 
The first signs of the forthcoming conflict appeared during the final stages of Soviet 
“perestroika” preceding the collapse of the USSR. Successful propaganda fuelled the fears of 
local Russian and Ukrainian and some “Sovietised Moldovans” that in the case of Repubic of 
Moldova’s independence through separation from the Soviet Union it would immediately 
join its “kin-state” Romania – the country with which the majority of inhabitants of the 
Republic of Moldova share a language, also cultural and historic tradition.  
 
As a result, in 2 of September 1990 the “Dniestrian Moldovan Socialist Soviet Republic in 
the composition of the USSR” was proclaimed. Soon after Moldova’s declaration of state 
sovereignty in June 1990, the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet claimed the region’s 
independence from Moldova, adopted a separate constitution, elected a president and 
arranged an independence referendum – all the events coupled with violent aggression 
against the fragile legitimate structures of the Republic of Moldova. A series of small-scale 
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clashes occurred in late 1991 and early 1992, culminating with a short but violent battle in the 
town of Bender in June 1992. Intervention by the Russian 14
th
 Army brought about a 
ceasefire, but also secured Transnistria’s continued separatist trends.  
 
It should be mentioned that initially, efforts to put an end to the armed conflict were 
undertaken within the format of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), as well as 
by the heads of the most interested states, namely, Russia and Republic of Moldova’s 
neighbours – Ukraine and Romania. For example, at the Kyiv meeting in March 1992, the 
heads of the CIS countries adopted a Declaration stating that the territorial integrity of the 
Republic of Moldova is the key element for stability in the entire region. Approaches to 
conflict settlement sought then to ensure broader international engagement, and expert level 
meetings included specialists from not only Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, but also from 
Romania.  
 
The decisive step to stop military clashes was made by the ceasefire agreement that was 
signed by the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation after a summit in Moscow 
held on 21 July 1992. By this Agreement, the principles of the peaceful settlement of the 
armed conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova were formulated and 
some control mechanisms proposed, including the setting up of a Joint Control Commission, 
and the establishment of a Security Zone (SZ) along the Nistru River. The agreement 
stipulated that its implementation has to be ensured by military contingents representing the 
Russian Federation and the “two parties directly involved in the conflict” – meaning the 
leaders of Transnistrian separatists and the legitimate authorities of the RM. Initially, the 
peacekeeping forces were composed mainly of Russian troops (five battalions), with a limited 
number of legitimate forces of the Republic of Moldova (three battalions) and Transnistrian 
separatists (two battalions), operating at checkpoints in three sectors of the SZ. A military 
observer mission was also launched in 1992, consisting of ten observers each from Russia, 
Russia, Republic of Moldova and the separatist region; ten Ukrainian observers were added 
in 1998. These agreements have been contested since they do not observe the UN and OSCE 
standards, do not mention the need for a genuinely multinational force or term for the 
mission, thus placing the Republic of Moldova in an unfavourable position in relation with its 
separatist part. The agreement also recognises the existence of some self-styled troops of the 
separatist Transnistria to be legitimate. 
 
On 4 February 1993, the OSCE Mission to Moldova was established and started to work in 
Chisinau in April and on 13 February 1995 in Tiraspol – the unofficial capital of the 
unrecognised “Transnistrian Moldovan Republic” (TMR). From that time on, the OSCE has 
functioned as the only international organisation directly involved in conflict settlement 
processes. Thus, external “mediators of the conflict” are represented by Russia (since 1992), 
the OSCE (beginning from 1993), and Ukraine (since 1997). Both the Republic of Moldova 
and the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Republic are engaged in all negotiations as the “sides 
of the conflict” on equal terms and with equal rights.  
 
The most important steps in a settlement process are usually regarded to be the following:  
 
On 8 May 1997, the Memorandum “On the basis for the Normalisation of Relations between 
the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria” was signed in Moscow. The concept of a 
“common state” was then introduced for the first time by the Russian Foreign Minister 
Yevgeny Primakov. Because of a rather dubious meaning of this very term, further 
negotiations were blocked by attempts of interpreting and defining the legal sense of it, and 
 7 
therefore, they have never reached even a point of discussing a division of competences 
between Moldova and the “TMR”. Because of the continuous obstruction by separatist 
authorities, Chisinau withdrew from negotiations between September 2001 and May 2002. 
 
In June 2002, a new approach to conflict settlement was articulated in the so-called “Kyiv 
Document”, and under pressure from the three mediators, Moldova rejoined the negotiations. 
This document proposed a federal structure as the main basis for Chisinau – Tiraspol 
relations; it outlined divided and shared competences, new federal institutions, and a system 
of international guarantees. However, the incompatible positions of the “two parties” made 
any serious progress impossible (over six months, only four of forty-two articles were 
discussed). 
 
In 2003, some new factors at the international, European and regional level gave rise to hopes 
for a substantial advance in the resolution of the Transnistrian problem. They include: more 
international attention to this conflict; the involvement of the EU (related, perhaps, to the 
appearance of its Security Strategy and the first three EU civil/military missions deployed in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Congo); increased activity of the OSCE under the 
Dutch Chairmanship, and the some progress in withdrawal of Russian arms, troops and 
equipment from the territory of the Transnistrian region. Taken together, these developments 
have also had a stimulating effect on talks between Chisinau and Tiraspol, that followed 
some initiatives put forward by President Voronin (but perceived as unacceptable 
concessions to separatist authorities by the political opposition and civil society of the RM, 
thus deepening the internal crisis and splits within the Moldovan society). 
 
On 16 November 2003, the positive trends mentioned above were reversed by the unilateral 
Moscow initiative known as the “Kozak Memorandum” (the full name of the document is 
“Memo on the Basic Principles of the State Structures of the Unified State”). According to 
the international expert assessment, the “Kozak Memorandum” “…was so riddled with 
problems that one wonders if the Kremlin seriously expected it to succeed” (Dov Lynch, 
2004). The international community, including the OSCE and the CoE, expressed strong 
disapproval of the document and the very initiative, which was not coordinated or discussed 
with any other party (except the RM). Acute protests by Moldova’s political opposition and 
civil society, together with an overtly negative reaction by the powerful international bodies, 
forced President Voronin to withdraw his support for this project, and eventuated in a 
previously unbelievable consolidation of Chisinau central authorities and society, united for 
the first time in ten years by their resistance to the Russian proposal.    
 
Stormy events of late 2004 – early 2005, related mainly to presidential and parliamentary 
elections in Ukraine, Romania and the Republic of Moldova, have changed the regional 
context of the Transnistrian conflict and created a new window of opportunities for its 
eventual resolution. Ukrainian proposals, first presented schematically at the GUAM Summit 
in Chisinau on 22 April, and then developed into the so-called “Yushchenko Plan” of May 
2005, although criticised for obvious flaws and dubious points, have been accepted as a 
framework for developing a new approach to conflict settlement, based on the idea of 
democratisation of the Transnistrian region as a cornerstone of its further reintegration into 
the Republic of Moldova.  
 
Over June – July 2005, Ukrainian proposals have been further developed and supplemented 
by a number of important legal acts and documents adopted by the Moldovan Parliament and 
Government. Focusing on the processes of democratisation and demilitarisation, these 
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documents provide convincing arguments for well advanced democratisation to precede the 
first local elections, which have to be prepared and carried out under the international 
(OSCE) aegis. Only in this case do the elections have a clear prospect of being internationally 
recognised and for the first time, bringing to power legitimate local authorities to represent 
the Transnistrian region in further negotiations concerning status problems, division of 
competences, etc. 
 
Sharing in the general idea and spirit of such an approach, trilateral expert group intended to 
take advantage of this and a number of other initiatives while developing this Policy Paper 
and concluding Recommendations.  
 
II. Changed context of the Transnistrian conflict 
 
Recent political changes and developments necessitate a new vision and new approach to this 
particular “frozen conflict” in order to replace the old one, which has proven to be 
ineffective. While working on the proposed solution(s) for the Transnistrian problem, the 
trilateral expert group considers these changes as having occurred on four levels: geopolitical, 
regional, national, and local. Those of the utmost potential importance for conflict settlement 
are as follows:  
 
II.1. Geopolitical  
 
The recent enlargement of NATO and the European Union changed the geopolitical map of 
Europe and made the Transnistrian conflict, with its actual and potential security threats, 
closer to the borders of the member states. This resulted in increased interest in Transnistrian 
issues on the part of these and other major international institutions, and of such a potent 
world power as the USA, also of Russia.  
 
Throughout the negotiation process, the status provided to the Transnistrian authorities as one 
of the “two sides of the conflict” – thus equating them with the legitimate authorities of the 
RM – empowered the former to pursue the policies that had led repeatedly to deadlock. Only 
by the end of 2002 did the EU Council start to respond, first by issuing a statement that 
identified Transnistrian obstruction as the main problem in the settlement talks, and in 
February 2003 by issuing an even stronger message, considering “…the obstructionism of the 
region's leadership and their unwillingness to change the status quo to be unacceptable”. As a 
next step, the EU Council applied sanctions against top Transniestrian leaders by introducing 
a travel ban for them that was also coordinated with the US. Joint EU – US sanctions have 
been prolonged twice – in 2004 and 2005. Although the direct practical impact of these 
measures on the settlement process is not yet evident, its potential and symbolic significance 
is of great value, and spreading of this ban to the territories of other states – not members of 
the EU – might be considered additional leverage for achieving real progress in the 
negotiation and settlement processes.   
 
Further and deeper involvement of powerful international actors in the processes aimed at a 
peaceful and sustainable solution to the Transnistrian problem would be beneficial for the 
eventual result. The first encouraging steps already taken include agreement by the EU and 
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US to participate in the negotiations (although only in the status of observers), and the Border 
Assistance Mission established by the EU, which started its operations on 1 December 2005.  
 
At the same time, some recent developments, connected to the eternal discrepancy between 
the principle of the inviolability of sovereign state borders and the right to self-determination, 
may have a potentially detrimental effect on the settlement of the long-lasted Transnistrian 
crisis. The ongoing UN-led negotiations on Kosovo status are already being used by a 
number of unrecognised separatist enclaves and pseudo-states as a signal to intensify efforts 
for gaining international recognition of their independence. This situation is often regarded as 
a potential threat to the fragile peace and stability in the Balkans, but it draws no less 
attention in the areas of the post-Soviet “frozen conflicts”, and within the Russian Federation. 
In this context, it is of vital importance to comprehend a major difference between the 
Transnistrian conflict and all the others, both in the Balkans and in the territories of former 
Soviet republics. This difference is the lack of a subject for self-determination in Transnistria 
– be it either a separate ethno-cultural entity (as, for example, in the case of Abkhazia) or a 
mono-ethnic minority group, compactly populating a certain region and rejecting any option 
of co-existence with the majority population of a legitimate state (the case of Kosovo closely 
resembling that of Nagorno Karabakh). Accordingly, the main ethnic groups of the Eastern 
Transnistrian region of the RM do not differ from those on the right bank of the Nistru River, 
and do not confront the latter along ethnic or religious lines. Therefore, a peaceful solution to 
the Transnistrian problem appears mainly to be a matter of political will and dedication by all 
actors involved in its settlement, but is foremost that of the most influential world powers. 
 
II.2. Regional 
 
At the regional level, the situation has changed in favour of establishing a more homogenous 
political space, comprised of countries sharing common European and Euro-Atlantic values, 
and moving – although with quite a different pace – in a common direction, namely, towards 
joining the EU and NATO.  
 
These changes gained impetus in 2004 – 2005 after the last round of elections in Ukraine, 
Romania and Moldova.  All of them demonstrated that the people strive for more freedom 
and democracy, thus confirming their European choice.  
 
One of the impacts of these events has been the essential improvement of bilateral and 
trilateral relations between Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, and Romania. Although not all 
of the previously accumulated tensions are already diffused, and a number of yet unsolved 
questions remain, an obvious improvement in the regional atmosphere is evident. The 
emerging trend of seeking mutual support and understanding gave rise to hopes that on this 
particular issue of solving Transnistrian problem, Moldova and its immediate neighbouring 
countries are able to develop a common vision and implement concerted and consolidated 
efforts to put an end to this protracted “frozen conflict”. The three regional actors should 
reach an accord in developing a joint, commitment-oriented solution that would be easier to 
promote and that would have more chances to be supported by the international community.  
 
Enhanced attention and emerging intentions to provide assistance to such endeavours have 
been already expressed by the Baltic countries and a number of other Central European states 
– new members of the EU and NATO – thus increasing the probability of eventual success. 
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II.3. National 
 
The complexity of the Transnistrian issue doesn’t offer to any of the players in the region all 
the tools for solving the conflict. Therefore, a trilateral cooperation effort is needed, based on 
a commitment oriented solution, so that each of the three neighbouring countries assumes its 
own part of the job, while exercising a common political will to solve the Transnistrian 
problem. 
 
Therefore, the three actors will make all necessary efforts to find and apply a common 
solution in compliance with the shared guidelines and main principles. Each party assumes, at 
the national level, commitments to promote such a solution by using its own opportunities, in 
compliance with its own policies and in regular consultations with the two other parties. All 
three regional actors assume some tasks aimed at promoting the changes necessary for 
democratisation of the Eastern districts of the RM, and preparing for the reintegration of the 
country. 
 
An essential (but not at all complete or exhaustive) list of the commitments assumed at the 
national level might include: 
 
For Romania: 
- Intensification of „advocating” activities in favour of RM’s and Ukraine’s future 
membership in NATO and the EU. 
- Blocking commercial relations with the economical agents in the Eastern region of the 
RM that do not observe Moldovan national legislation and licensing. 
 
For Ukraine: 
- Strict implementation and observance of bilateral intergovernmental agreements and 
protocols concerning regime and regulations of border and customs control, trade and 
economic relations with enterprises and businesses of the Transnistrian region of the 
RM etc.  
- Continuation and intensification of the efforts to stop smuggling, trafficking and other 
illegal activities across the Ukrainian/Moldovan border, especially its Transnistrian 
section, and to curb corruption in the area.  
- Using its influence on certain economic agents operating within the Eastern region of 
the RM (especially those with Ukrainian investors) in order to persuade them to get 
Moldovan licenses and observe nationally established procedures and regulations for 
taxation and economic activities.  
 
For the Republic of Moldova: 
 
- Providing practical assistance and utilizing the existing framework to help enterprises 
located in the Eastern region obtain legal licenses for their activities. 
- Enforcing internal customs control and fiscal measures. 
- Advancing administrative, economic and political reforms according to European 
standards.  
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II.4. Local 
 
Over the whole period of Transnistrian separatism and ineffective conflict settlement, ruling 
illegitimate authorities did their best to strengthen their grip on the population and to acquire 
the attributes of statehood. As a result, today the breakaway region is equipped with a 
president, a parliament, a court system, security bodies, police, a currency, postal stamps, a 
flag, an anthem, etc. It also developed a self-styled educational system based on a puzzling 
combination of relic Soviet-era textbooks and manuals with such innovations as “The History 
of Transnistria”, and “The Literature of Transnistria”. Characterising the situation in 
Transnistria, the report prepared by the Centre for the Independence of Judges and Courts of 
the International Commission of Jurists following its fact finding mission in February 2004, 
concluded that “the Trans-Dniester region is still firmly located in the Soviet period”. 
 
Nevertheless, certain recent events in the area have shown that the seemingly entrenched 
tendencies might not be as irreversible as they may appear. These include attempts to curb 
presidential powers, the emergence of a political opposition to the repressive regime, a self-
styled opposition media and fledgling civil society structures. The acceptance of greater 
involvement of the EU and the US into the negotiation process – impossible to think of even 
in the beginning of the century – also signifies the possibility of positive changes.  
 
These developments are mixed with opposite, dangerous trends of using new tools and 
instruments, such as rather extremist and aggressive “NGOs” and public associations 
artificially created by the security structures to speak on behalf of the “Transnistrian people” 
and “civil society”. 
 
The situation developing after the last illegitimate “elections” to the Transnistrian “Supreme 
Soviet”, which took place on 11 December 2005, also cannot be assessed unambiguously. As 
a result of these elections, a more pragmatic and perhaps more flexible clan named the 
“Obnovleniye” movement (representing mostly big regional businesses) won 23 out of 43 
deputy mandates, and its leader Yevgeny Shevchuk replaced the former speaker Grigori 
Maracuta, who had held this position throughout all previous elections. Of great importance 
for further developments in Transnistria might have been  the bilateral Moldova-Ukraine 
intergovernmental agreement signed by 30 December (due to go into force on January 25) 
and stipulating that all cargo leaving and entering  Transnistria could cross the Ukrainian-
Moldovan border only with Moldovan customs forms. Therefore, if the decision on the 
regulation of the transit of goods across the Moldovan-Ukrainian border is fully implemented 
and strictly observed, and the EU Border Assistance Mission functions effectively, the 
biggest Transnistrian businesses (in particular, the firm “Scheriff”) are likely to suffer 
substantial losses. These new circumstances, as well as the increased uncertainty of operating 
within the unrecognised and illegitimate pseudo-state, may push local politicians towards a 
more flexible position, liable to compromises.   
 
Indeed, before the deadline of January 25, 50 Transnistrian enterprises got registration and 
obtained licenses from the RM’s Trade Chamber that allowed them to continue their 
economic activities as legal entities complying with the Moldova’s legislation. But quite 
unexpectedly, and despite the approval of the bilateral Moldova-Ukraine agreement by both 
the EU and US representatives, as well as by the Head of the OSCE mission to the RM 
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William Hill, the very day when the agreement had to be implemented Ukraine suspended it 
unilaterally, stating that its enforcement should be delayed. Such a move seriously 
compromised Ukraine’s image of a reliable and predictable partner and essentially 
complicated the third round of negotiations in the “5 + 2” format (January 26 – 27) that have 
been characterized as practically “failed”.  
  
Therefore, recent events are cautioning against too much optimism regarding the prospect of 
quick and painless settlement of Transnistrian problem. At the same time, the new concerted 
and dedicated efforts of the international community and regional actors, especially if 
empowered by the potent support ‘from below”, might indeed become decisive in drawing 
closer the eventual reintegration of the Republic of Moldova. 
III. Current stage of Moldova/Transnistria relations 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Moldova did not succeed yet to 
become a unified, viable and democratic state within the borders of the former Soviet 
Socialist Moldavian Republic, because during the period 1990-1992, the fragile state bodies 
of the Republic of Moldova were destroyed in its Eastern area by violent means. 
 
As a result of the protracted “frozen” conflict on the left bank of the Nistru River, the 
presence of the Republic of Moldova as a state is reduced to six localities situated in the 
neighbourhood of the town of Dubăsari, under the jurisdiction of the Moldovan constitutional 
authorities; to eight schools, including a school in Tiraspol, which are a part of the 
educational system of the Republic of Moldova; to several institutions (police, penitentiary) 
in the town of Bender, and about 270 thousand people (a total of about 550 thousand people) 
who have consciously opted for Moldovan citizenship, despite the discriminatory policy 
promoted by Tiraspol. In addition, the Moldovan state is also represented in its Eastern area 
by economic entities which, despite the repressive policy pursued by the Tiraspol 
administration, have been registered in Chişinău according to legislation of the Republic of 
Moldova. 
The above-mentioned forms of presence of the Moldovan state on the territory under 
separatist control cannot influence, at least for the time being, either the political situation in 
the region, or the negotiation process; ruling bodies of the Transnistrian region continue to 
control the population and keep a firm grip on it by using repressive means inherent to 
totalitarian regimes.  
 
For the Republic of Moldova, the importance and the gravity of the Transnistrian problem 
stem from the following: 
 
- in the Eastern area of the Republic of Moldova, fundamental human rights, in particular, 
the rights of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, are systematically infringed, the 
Moldovan state being unable to defend them; 
- in the Eastern area of the Republic of Moldova, the young generation is maturing within 
an informational environment hostile to the Republic of Moldova, established and maintained 
by the separatist regime. Thus, it does not identify itself with the Moldovan state and does not 
realise the need for the reunification of the Republic of Moldova;  
- people in the area under the separatist regime do not have any experience of political 
democracy, as they have directly passed from control by the Soviet regime to control by the 
anti-democratic separatist regime. Therefore, to enable them to use consciously the tools of 
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political democracy, most people will need a period of adaptation to the new democratic 
reality, if such a reality emerges; 
- the existence of an unsettled conflict, alongside with the illegal deployment of foreign 
troops on its territory, seriously affects the establishment of a democratic rule of law and 
threatens the prospects of the Republic of Moldova as a viable state; 
- being a hotbed of corruption and organised crime within Moldovan society, as well as in 
the region, the Transnistrian conflict seriously harms the socioeconomic development of the 
Republic of Moldova and its prospects for further European integration.  
 
Taking into account that the process of re-introducing the jurisdiction of the Moldovan state 
in the districts on the left bank of the Nistru River has not been performed yet, the solution 
for the Transnistrian problem should be conceived as an integral part of the process of 
strengthening a viable and democratic Republic of Moldova throughout its entire national 
territory. This process should be complemented by international guarantees for state security, 
by means of a tighter cooperation of the Republic of Moldova with NATO. 
 
IV. Defining a solution for the Transnistria problem 
 
IV.1.  Main Conditions for Conflict Settlement  
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned, the Transnistrian conflict settlement requires 
the following parallel processes: 
1. Demilitarisation of Transnistria, by means of: 
1.1  withdrawal of Russian troops and removal of ammunition; 
1.2  dismantling the paramilitary structures of the “Transnistrian Moldovan Republic”, 
starting with the repressive structures (the so-called Ministry of State Security). 
1.3 The previous step should be supplemented with simultaneous reintegration of the 
citizens of the Republic of Moldova serving in the separatist Army and Militia, 
providing them with proper jobs in the reunified society while respecting their dignity 
and professionalism, if they are not subject of actions sanctioned by the penal law. 
 
2. Achieving preliminary conditions for democratisation of Transnistria, by means of: 
2.1  ensuring the protection of fundamental human rights; 
2.2  ensuring the operation of the tools of political democracy as a result of spreading  
the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova over the eastern region of the country; 
 
3. Democratisation of the reunified Republic of Moldova, by means of: 
 3.1 strengthening the democratic rule of law throughout the entire territory of the 
Republic of Moldova; 
3.2  securing the reunified state by seeking international guarantees from European and 
Euro-Atlantic structures. 
  
To achieve the above-mentioned goals, the following measures should be undertaken: 
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- setting up the legal framework required for the democratisation of Transnistria and of the 
reunified state; 
- setting up the framework required for the provision of humanitarian, socioeconomic and 
legal aid and of the required guarantees to the people of Transnistria;  
- setting up the legal framework for the period of transition from the present  status quo to 
the final settlement of the conflict (holding local and general elections, reunification of 
the legal, socioeconomic, informational, educational spaces, etc.); 
- taking responsibilities and performing actions under the competence of the Moldovan 
state in the process of country reunification. 
 
IV.2. Main Principles 
 
1. The solution for the Transnistrian issue must be based, in accordance with established 
international law and accepted norms, on basic principles of state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. It also must be sustainable, namely, 
its effects should not produce a relapse of the conflict.  
 
2. The solution must not weaken the Republic of Moldova as a recognised state within 
its borders, but enhance the cohesion of this state and its ability to solve fundamental 
problems of society. 
 
3. The solution must support the legal authorities to re-instate the central institutions of 
administration at the local level on the East bank of the Nistru. The RM must exercise 
the tasks of the central administration in Transnistria districts thus re-establishing its 
territorial integrity. 
  
4. Since the Republic of Moldova is a recognised state and member of the international 
democratic community, with a clear option to join the European Union, postponement 
and/or a prolonged period of implementation, as well as difficulties in reaching an 
eventual solution to Transnistria problem should not prevent the Republic of Moldova 
to freely choose options for its security according to its citizens’ best interests, 
without any outside constraint. 
 
5. The solution regarding the desired form of administrating the local and regional 
authority, regarding the subsidiary principle, and the designed form of autonomy 
(local or regional) must take into account the will of the residents of the Eastern bank, 
freely expressed and qualified (according to the law of the RM). The form of 
autonomy should be designed in a coherent way at the level of the whole Republic of 
Moldova, enforced by the law according to European principles of local autonomy. 
This should not harm the cohesion of the state, the existence and functioning of the 
central administration bodies, in the entire territory, internationally recognised. 
 
6. The Transnistria issue must be solved within the framework of a European security 
strategy for the Republic of Moldova. The fact that the RM is extending its relations 
with NATO and receives more assistance in the perspective of future admission to the 
Alliance offers the basis for a stable and permanent solution to RM security problems.  
 
7. The solution has to take advantage of the existing documents on the table, in 
particular, the Yushchenko plan, The Decision of the Moldovan Parliament of 10 June 
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2005 (The Declaration on the Ukrainian Initiative Concerning the Settlement of the 
Transdniestrian Conflict, Appeal on the Criteria of Democratisation of the 
Transdniestrian Zone of the Republic of Moldova, and the Appeal concerning the 
Principles and Conditions of the Demilitarisation of the Transdniestrian Zone),  and 
the Law of the Republic of Moldova “On the Basic Principles of the Special Legal 
Status of the Localities in the Area of the Left Bank of the Dnister River 
(Transnistria), # 173-XVI, July 22 2005. 
 
8. No external solution should be imposed to the state of Republic of Moldova against 
the interests of its citizens and in breach of its sovereignty. 
IV.3. Demilitarisation 
The situation overview 
 
At present military forces on the territory of Eastern districts of Moldova include troops that 
are subordinated either to the regime of the “Transnistrian Moldavian Republic” – like the 
Transnistrian army, Transnistrian ministry of internal affairs, Transnistrian ministry of state 
security, or represent Russia – the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF), also the 
units of guardians of ammunition stocks and other units. 
 
The Operational Group of Russian Forces, as well as the 14
th
 Army heavy equipment in 
Error! No index entries found.Treaty (CFE). The process of withdrawal initiated first in 1990 
and then in 1992 at the CSCE Ministerial in Stockholm, where Russia committed itself to 
withdraw from Moldova, in 2006 is not yet completed. Approximately 1,400 Russian military 
personnel are still present on this territory.  
 
Such situation makes the settlement of the conflict complicated, involves Russian Federation 
into the heart of the conflict and according to the Council of Europe Opinion n°193 (1996), 
jeopardises the international commitments Russia has undertaken. 
 
At the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999, Russia accepted deadlines for the 
withdrawal or destruction of all CFE-related equipment by 2001, and the withdrawal of 
troops by the end of 2002. The OSCE Porto Ministerial (2002) extended the deadline for the 
withdrawal of the remaining troops and the remaining equipment to the end of 2003. 
Regrettably, the mentioned above commitments have not been fulfilled as well. Moreover, 
according to the Ambassador Hill report to the OSCE Permanent Council, 5 February 2004, 
Transnistrian authorities had in several instances failed to honour a signed agreement on 
destruction of ammunitions on site.  
 
Thus a major question of the official status of the Russian military based on this territory, in 
particular in regard to international law, as well as the question of perspectives of the CFE 
Treaty in the region, remains open.  
 
Another military force on the territory of Eastern districts of the RM is a peacekeeping 
structure established by the ceasefire agreement of July 1992. The peacekeeping force is 
under the supervision of the "Joint Control Commission" which also oversees key security 
and administrative operations in the Security Zone. There are strong doubts that a 
peacekeeping force composed of representatives of the "conflicting parties" complies with the 
idea of "traditional peacekeeping", which makes the issue even more complicated. Moreover, 
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people residing on both banks, and separated by the Security Zone, do not feel any animosity 
towards each other. Because in contrast to seemingly similar situations in other conflict areas, 
these are one and the same people, not divided along either ethnic or religious lines, and 
consisting of the same ethnic groups (the three main groups are represented by Moldovans, 
Ukrainians, and Russians) differing only in proportions. Therefore, not a single episode of 
violence “from below” has occurred throughout the whole period after the seize-fire 
agreement of 1992, and this is not at all the achievement of peacekeeping troops or other 
military/paramilitary structures. Quite the opposite, incidents of offences and abuses that 
have happened, and recently increased in number, are caused by armed personnel belonging 
to the illicit Transnistrian Army, militia and security services or, even more alarming, 
perpetrated by the mentioned “peacekeepers” themselves. Whereas nothing like insurgent or 
“partisan” activities have ever been observed on the part of the residents of either the RM or 
its separatist Eastern region. 
 
In addition, Russia has staffed its peacekeeping forces with troops from the OGRF, 
establishing in such a way the inappropriate link between the Russian military and the 
peacekeeping forces. 
 
The situation is getting even more complicated because of other paramilitary structures, 
either functioning under the umbrella of the regime of the “Transnistrian Moldovan 
Republic” or formed by some officers and military personnel formerly attached to the 14th 
Army, who remained in Transnistria after demobilisation and established their "own private 
armed militias", possibly interacting with the Transnistrian troops from the local ministry of 
internal affairs. Such militias, according to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Sub-
Committee on Democratic Governance 1-4 March 2004 Mission Report, could be responsible 
for the trafficking of small arms and other weapons.  
 
Such a background explains why a goal of complete demilitarisation of the area of this 
artificially constructed and purely political conflict, if achieved, would be of great help and 
special importance for reaching its peaceful and sustainable solution.  
 
In this context, we would like to emphasise that by “complete” demilitarisation we 
understand not only finalising the withdrawal of Russian troops and arsenals in accordance 
with the commitments taken at the OSCE Istanbul Summit of 1999. The success of 
demilitarisation element of a whole plan for putting the end to Transnistrian problem 
depends, not to lesser extent, on dissolving the illegal paramilitary structures mentioned 
above, together with their gradual incorporation into and integration with the respective 
bodies of the Republic of Moldova. At the same time, firm social and security guarantees 
should be provided for personnel and servicemen, presented in Transnistrian region in 
excessive quantity but usually having no other employment and job opportunities. 
 
Such guarantees have actually been articulated in the Decision of the Moldovan Paliament of 
10 June 2005 (The Declaration on the Ukrainian Initiative Concerning the Settlement of the 
Transdniestrian Conflict, Appeal on the Criteria of Democratisation of the Transdniestrian 
Zone of the Republic of Moldova, and the Appeal concerning the Principles and Conditions 
of the Demilitarisation of the Transnistrian Zone), further developed by the law “On the basic 
principles of the special legal statute of the localities on the left bank of Nistru (Transnistria)” 
adopted in July 2005. Additional, more detailed list of social guarantees for the population of 
the left bank of the Nistru River was elaborated at a special sitting of Moldovan government 
with the participation of President Voronin on 29 July 2005. They should be further 
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supplemented by the RM defence and security sector reforms aimed at restructuring and 
reorganising its national defence and security bodies into the democratically controlled and 
effective structures. Such steps should also be complemented with programmes addressing 
the consequences and problems of the defence reform, – such as assistance programmes for 
retired and redundant personnel. The RM obligations in this respect should be checked and 
monitored by the OSCE and/or other international bodies and organisations.  
 
Therefore, middle term strategy for demilitarising the region assumes completing partial 
withdrawal and partial in situ utilisation of the remaining Russian arsenals near Kolbasna, 
thus lifting the necessity of Russian troops to guard them, and substituting predominantly 
Russian peacekeepers by a limited contingent of international military and civil missions. 
Next stage would consist of changing mixed – military/civilian – format of a peacekeeping 
operation for a civilian one (taking as a precedent the police missions already deployed by the 
EU in such countries as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, also civilian EU operation in 
Georgia (Rule of Law Mission). 
 
Introducing demilitarisation element along the guidelines of the so-called “Yushchenko 
plan”, into the general context of seeking solution for Transnistrian problem and ensuring 
reintegration of the Republic of Moldova through a process of democratisation, would 
produce an added value in terms of regional security and stability.  
 
The process of dismantling the Transnistrian military system has the following 
dimensions: 
 
- Withdrawal of Russian troops (including the “peace-keeping forces”) and ammunition. 
- Dissolution of military, paramilitary and security forces in the area on the left bank of the 
Nistru River.  
 
The withdrawal of Russian troops and ammunition implies the withdrawal of nearly 1,400 
militaries and of 20 000 tonnes of ammunition. Such a measure enjoys a broad support of the 
international community and alongside with highly appreciated Russia’s agreements with 
Georgia, will be for the international community a prerequisite for the ratification of the 
adapted CFE Treaty. International financial support could possibly be provided to such an 
end. The Ukrainian political leadership should guarantee the process of Russian troops and 
munitions transit via the territory of Ukraine. 
 
Demobilisation implies development and implementation of a programme of release-
conversion, intended to guarantee the social and legal protection of militaries, and to provide 
other possibilities for professional re-qualification and employment for about 2000-2500 
regular soldiers of the dissolved military units.  
 
The establishment of the control on arms, equipment and other military patrimony requires 
the implementation of international assistance programmes aimed at collecting and 
neutralising arms and ammunition, as well as the conversion of military patrimony to civil 
ends. 
 
Reiterating the Appeal of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova concerning the 
principles and conditions for demilitarisation of the Transnistrian area, we would like to 
stress its importance, in particular, the following conditions for the demilitarisation of the 
Transnistrian area regarded as indispensable:  
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1. The Russian Federation shall complete the withdrawal and liquidation of its 
military arsenal, as well as the withdrawal of its military troops from the territory 
of the Republic of Moldova by the end of 2005. 
2. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova will recognize that military 
units deployed in the security zone according to the Moldavian-Russian 
Agreement of 21 July 1992, have already achieved their purposes and should be 
reduced gradually and removed completely from the territory of the country till 
December 31, 2006. Simultaneously, within the mentioned period, after a request 
made by the Republic of Moldova to the OSCE, the present formula of 
peacekeeping operations shall be gradually transformed into an international 
mechanism of military and civil observers under the mandate of the OSCE, while 
the Moldovan-Russian Agreement of the 21 of July 1992 will be out of force. The 
international mission of military and civil observers under the OSCE mandate 
shall operate in the Republic of Moldova up to the full political settlement of the 
Transnistrian problem.   
3. The Republic of Moldova commits to propose, within the “Partnership for Peace” 
NATO Programme, and to achieve through the International Mission of Military 
and Civil Observers, the dissolution of military formations in the area, the 
liquidation of weaponry and military equipment, as well as social rehabilitation 
and re-qualification of persons belonging to the staff of so-called Transnistrian 
military forces. 
4. In its turn, after the fulfilling by the Russian Federation of its obligations assumed 
within the Istanbul OSCE Summit (1999) on full, not delayed and transparent 
withdrawal of its troops and arms from the territory of the Republic of Moldova 
(including the contingent and armament under the Moldovan-Russian Agreement 
of 21 July 1992), The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova expresses its 
readiness to ratify the adapted Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 
which represents a fundamental element of the European security.  
We believe that the approach proposed above has certain advantages and is more realistic in 
comparison with the recently presented plan of gradual demilitarisation of both the RM and 
its breakaway Transnistrian region, developed jointly by the Russian Federation and the 
OSCE. Any attempt of implementing the latter would instigate, beyond any doubts, large-
scale public protests and civic unrest in the Republic of Moldova, thus undermining its 
internal stability recently achieved through a difficult accord between the main political 
forces, and threatening further Moldova’s progress on a path towards European and Euro-
Atlantic integration. To the contrary, the approach proposed by the working group will result 
in securing the international community against the danger of a collapse of the whole regime 
of control over conventional arms in Europe, and contribute to the Transnistria problem 
solution. 
IV.4. Successive stages of democratisation and reintegration of the 
Transnistrian region 
 
Although full democratic transformation in many areas of public life in the RM are yet to be 
achieved, its eastern Transnistrian region is lagging far behind and needs a number of special 
measures to be implemented in order to prepare its residents to perform basic democratic 
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activities, and to appreciate a prospect of reintegration into the Republic of Moldova.  We 
believe that:  
 
- Democratisation is not only the freedom of voting; it involves a complex step-by-step 
process taking several years to prepare local population for the first free and fair local 
elections conducted according to internationally accepted standards and on the basis 
of the RM legislation. 
 
- The democratisation process should meet several minimum criteria to ensure a 
qualified choice of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova residing on the East bank 
of the Nistru River. 
 
- The basis of the solution stands in the full democratisation of the Republic of 
Moldova as a whole, because for a complete integration of the Eastern bank, a 
functional democracy in compliance with European criteria is needed in the whole 
Republic of Moldova. 
  
- Only the inhabitants of the Republic of Moldova with residence in the Eastern region 
can vote in local elections, and only the citizens of Moldova can be elected. Such a 
process cannot be started before the return of persons who were forced to flee the 
region as a result of violent conflict and persecutions by Transnistrian separatists 
(internally displaced persons and refugees). The Republic of Moldova will grant full 
access to its citizenship, without any financial and technical barriers, according to the 
law in force, to all former inhabitants of the region on the 27 of August 1991. 
 
- The qualification of the Republic of Moldova’s citizens in the Eastern districts, in 
order to decide their destiny, would be acquired through “opening” Transnistria: 
ensuring freedom of the press, free action of the political parties and NGOs registered 
according to the laws of the Republic of Moldova, free debates and political 
alternative. Only after the basic minimum criteria for democracy will be enforced, and 
the first round of local elections in the Transnistrian region carried out under 
international control, could the next round of local elections take place in the whole 
Republic of Moldova thus strengthening local communities throughout the country, 
NGOs, and political parties. For residents of the Transnistrian region, participation in 
the repeated local elections on all-national level will be especially important for 
ensuring the first democratic reflexes of the local population and empowering the 
local communities.  
 
- After two rounds of free and fair elections, the local administrative structures – 
functioning on the basis of RM’s legislation – must decide, after a period of 
campaigning and debates on alternatives, if they wish a strong local administration 
under the direct subordination of Chisinau, or if they prefer a regional form of 
administration, with Tiraspol city as the centre. The local referendums will signify the 
freely expressed and qualified will of people favouring one of the options, in every 
local community. The result will establish a contiguous region that will be 
administered according to the selected model. 
 
- After these steps are accomplished, the road is clear for regional elections in the 
defined region whose population made its choice in favour of certain status and form 
of administration. The elected leaders, citizens of the Republic of Moldova, are 
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eligible to negotiate the final distribution of competences between the central and 
regional administration, according to the Yushchenko plan and to the Law of 
Republic of Moldova “On the main principles of the special legal status of the 
localities of the left bank of Nistru (Transnistria)”, and to define the degree of 
autonomy that the established region would enjoy. 
 
- The reinsertion of central authorities into the Transnistrian region will then be 
conducted in close cooperation with the democratically elected local authorities. The 
representatives of the central administration in the former separatist region should be 
trained under EU programmes for police, law enforcement agencies, judges and 
public administration. After graduating from such training courses, representatives of 
the central administration will be reinserted step-by-step, following the procedures 
used for instance in Macedonia: day-by-day for some hours, together with the 
international police mission representatives, and taking into account the local 
authorities’ preferences and options. Realisation of a broad Civic Education 
Programme would be of great help for consolidating society at large. 
 
- The next steps should focus on the reintegration of the army and law enforcement 
agencies. Preparation for this difficult task might be carried out with the assistance of 
the EU mission to the RM and other parties willing to contribute to the eventual 
reintegration of the RM. Joint training courses might be needed, as well as other 
confidence building measures and programmes.  
 
IV.5. Requirements of a minimum democratic climate  
 
The basic criteria for a minimum democratic climate will certainly allow the elections to be 
free and fair; there are a number of preconditions that must be accomplished on the left bank 
of the Nistru River:  
 
Freedom of association:  
• liberal framework for people’s freedom to associate, to create and run public 
associations, based on international standards of registration and functioning; 
• right of peaceful assembly shall be recognised, and no restrictions can be imposed on 
the exercise of this right other than foreseen by the legislation in force; 
• free access to associate with others, i.e. joining trade unions, creating NGOs, setting 
up political parties; 
• civic activities, including those of NGOs, shall be carried out on the basis of the 
domestic law and international conventions. 
 
Free access to information: 
• free exercise of the right to receive and share information that is of public interest;  
• freedom of expression, including freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the 
form of art, or by any other means; 
• ban of any form of official censorship in the mass media, except in cases specifically 
recognised as ‘racist, xenophobic, or calling to public violence’; any propaganda of 
war shall be prohibited by law, as well as inciting national, racial, ethnic or religious 
hatred, advocating discrimination and violence; 
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• non-interference into free communication by electronic means. 
 
 
Freedom of conscience, faith and thought:  
• freedom of faith, the unrestricted right to participate in religious activities and express 
religious identities; 
• this right includes the freedom to keep or to change a religion or belief of one’s own 
choice, and freedom to manifest his/her religion or belief in worship, observance, 
practice and teaching, either individually or in community with others, in public or 
private;  
• inter-religious and inter-confessional tolerance promoted; 
• freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs subject only to such limitations as 
prescribed by the domestic law (of the RM) in order to protect public safety, order, 
health, or morals, as well as fundamental rights and freedoms of others; 
• equal rights of religious activities guaranteed and protected; 
• registration of faith-based organisations (churches) ensured. 
 
Political Freedoms: 
• liberalisation of political activities, i.e. registration of political parties or movements 
on the basis of internationally recognised regulations and laws of the Republic of 
Moldova;  
• prohibition of intervention of local and state security bodies into political and 
electoral processes; 
• free and equitable access to media for all political forces guaranteed by national and 
international monitoring of the process;  
• national/linguistic minorities should have an effective mechanism of representation at 
both the local and national level (to be developed); 
• citizens shall have the right and opportunities to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs, to vote and be elected in regular elections recognised by domestic law (of the 
RM), which shall be held by universal and equal suffrage, secret ballots, guaranteeing 
to all persons equal and effective protection against any sort of discrimination on any 
ground, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political preferences, ethnic or 
social origin, property status, etc. 
 
Mass Media Freedom: 
• opening media space for Moldovan printed and electronic media;  
• adoption of appropriate regulations to run the local/regional audiovisual sector, 
including local public broadcasting, in conformity with the European Convention of 
Human Rights; 
• free and equitable access to media by NGOs and other civil society actors; 
• appropriate laws protecting the right of journalists to not disclose their sources of 
information.  
 
Local self-government: 
• empowerment of local governments with local autonomy rights, i.e. incorporation of 
the European Charter of Self-Government, including financial, self-organisation, and 
property rights; 
• financial autonomy guaranteed and non-interference with the local public affairs of 
bodies other than local self-government elected authorities. 
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Anti-extremist laws 
• prohibition of the functioning of xenophobic, racist or other extremist organisations, 
proved as such by judiciary decisions based on national legislation and international 
conventions; 
• monitoring of hate-speech and other forms of propaganda in the local/regional mass 
media. 
 
Free movement of individuals: 
• free movement of persons and services on the whole territory of the Republic of 
Moldova, i.e. elimination of artificial obstacles hindering communication between the 
left and right banks of the Nistru River;  
• every law-abiding person staying permanently or temporarily on the territory of the 
Moldovan state shall have the right to freedom of movement and freedom to choose 
the place of residence; 
• elimination of taxes, any restrictions, the “black list” of persons prevented from 
entering the Transnistrian region. 
 
Functioning of an independent judiciary: 
• status of judiciary to be strengthened and linked to the organisation of independent 
judiciary in Moldova; 
• extended competence of the general prosecutor’s office has to be limited and 
counterbalanced by an independent judiciary;  
• any sort of interference by security services and/or the administration in the work of 
the judiciary shall be avoided and further monitored. 
 
Human Rights and Minority Protection: 
• full and effective equality of all citizens, irrespective to national belonging or social 
status before the courts and tribunals; everybody shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial court, established by law of the 
RM; 
• right to individual liberty and security of individuals; no one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention, while those arrested or detained on a criminal charge 
shall be brought before a judge authorised by law to exercise judicial power, and shall 
be entitled to a trial within a reasonable time or be released; 
• full access to effective remedies if there are some human rights violation; such 
remedies shall be determined and applied by a competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authority; 
• awareness-raising on human rights issues among the staff of law-enforcement 
agencies should be continued in cooperation with human rights NGOs; 
• imprisonment for political views shall be banned and prosecuted, and no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
• full observance of the PACE and Venice Commission recommendations on 
national/ethnic minorities rights shall be ensured. 
 
Realisation of the proposed solution would require pulling together all tools and instruments 
of the three regional actors on the level of both state bodies and NGO’s. If strengthened by 
the support provided by other countries and international organisations, this plan would lead 
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to the eventual success of the described solution to the Transnistrian problem which we 
regard as correct and sustainable.  
 
Also, we strongly believe that all international actors should join their efforts in order to 
promote and support elaboration and implementation of a vast Civic Education Program in 
the Eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova aimed at familiarization of the population 
with the basic principles of democracy, the rule of law, functioning of a democratically 
established state, the place and role of the political democracy and of political parties under a 
multiparty system, the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and its political system, the 
Electoral code, the basic rights and freedoms that citizens of Moldova are enjoying. 
 
 
V. Specific Issues to be addressed 
 
V.1. Actions on the Republic of Moldova side 
 
On 16 – 17 May 2005, Ukraine launched a Plan for the Transnistrian conflict settlement 
which proposes, as a key-element, the democratisation of the region, followed by local 
elections conducted under international supervision and the establishment, in such a way, of a 
new Transnistrian partner in the negotiation process. This idea enjoyed the support of many 
participants in the negotiation process. At the same time, there are contradictory visions 
concerning the democratisation criteria. The Republic of Moldova has set a legal frame which 
aims at democratisation of Transnistria by means of accommodating the political process in 
the area into the constitutional space of the Republic of Moldova. 
On 10 June 2005, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova passed Decision no. 117-XVI 
on the Ukrainian Initiative Concerning the Settlement of the Transnistrian Conflict and 
Measures for Democratisation and Demilitarisation of the Transnistrian Zone. It includes 
Declaration on the Ukrainian Initiative, Appeal on the Criteria of Democratisation of the 
Transnisitrian Zone of the Republic of Moldova, and Appeal Concerning the Principles and 
Conditions of the Demilitarisation of the Transnistrian Zone. The document points out that 
“free and democratic elections could not be held in the Transnistrian area as long as the 
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and the international democratic standards are 
disregarded, the political pluralism and freedom of speech are lacking, and attitudes different 
from the ones imposed by force are repressed”. Such a provision sets clearly the conditions 
for the implementation of the democratisation process and for conducting elections in the 
Transnistrian area according to the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and to the 
criteria set by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.  
Among other important measures defined, these documents call for: 
- liquidation of the political police (the so-called Ministry of State Security) which 
suppresses any manifestation of freedom and eliminates the political opponents to the 
separatist regime thus hindering the preparation and organisation of free and democratic 
elections in compliance with OSCE  and Council of Europe standards; 
- reformation of so-called judicial power in the Transnistrian area; 
- releasing political prisoners illegally detained in the prisons of the Transnistrian area, 
according to the European Court of Human Rights decision of 8 July 2004; 
 24 
- removal of the obstacles to free activity of political parties in the Republic of Moldova on 
the territory of the Transnistrian zone; 
- holding elections in the Transnistrian area under the exclusive supervision of an 
International Electoral Committee, under the OSCE mandate, with the largest  
representation of the member-states within it; 
- monitoring of democratic standards by the International Electoral Committee, at least five 
months before the elections.  
 
At the same time, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova sets the requirement that: “the 
international monitoring of the democratic standards in the Transnistrian area, as well as the 
implementation of the electoral process by the International Electoral Committee cannot 
entail any consequence on the recognition of this entity under the international law”. 
On 22 July 2005, based on the Ukrainian Plan for the Transnistrian Conflict Settlement, the 
Parliament of the Republic of Moldova passed Law no. 173-XVI “On the basic principles of 
the special legal status of the localities in the area on the left bank of the Nistru River 
(Transnistria)”. The law provides for some competences of Transnistria within the Republic 
of Moldova which, according to the Ukrainian Plan, must be defined before holding 
democratic elections in Transnistria. 
Among the obligations taken by the RM are:  
The Republic of Moldova must diversify the sources of information available for the people 
of Transnistria, especially by launching special programmes on radio and TV channels with 
coverage in the Transnistrian area. 
The Republic of Moldova must modify the present legal frame with a view to simplify the 
procedure of registration of non-governmental organisations from the East Bank by central 
fiscal bodies.  
 
V.2. Necessity to modify the electoral system of the Republic of 
Moldova in view of the state reunification 
Granting the residents of Transnistria with the possibility to elect and be elected deputies of 
the legislative body of a reunified Moldova within a special constituency would be a step 
towards the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. This implies updating of the electoral 
system.  
Since 1993, Moldova applies a totally proportional system: one country – one electoral 
constituency. This system is subject to much criticism, since the MPs from the capital city are 
usually overrepresented in the legislature, whereas the MPs from the field are 
underrepresented. The representation ratio is 70:30, while the number of voters in the capital 
city counts at about 25%. Therefore, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe as 
well as OSCE/ODIHR recommended to the Republic of Moldova to modify the single 
electoral constituency and to set a system of local constituencies with multi-mandate 
constituencies for the territorial-administrative units with a special status, according to article 
111 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova.   
A draft law intended to make such amendments has already been developed. Passing this law 
is a matter of political will. The implementation of the limited proportional system with 
several multi-mandate constituencies will raise the problem of regional parties. Article 38 of 
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the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova provides for equal treatment of all political 
parties.  
This means that amendments to only the Law on Parties would not be enough to help solve 
the problem. The solution should include liberalisation of the Law on Parties by lowering the 
minimal number of required members and the number of territorial-administrative units 
where parties are compelled to have branches with a minimal share of members.    
 
V.3. Issue of dual citizenship 
In general, the issue of citizenship for residents of the Transnistrian region of the RM is a 
complicated one and not to be solved easily.  
For over 15 years, the residents of Transnistria were deprived of the right to choose their 
citizenship freely. The separatist regime, whose leaders themselves keep Russian citizenship, 
promotes by all means increasing the number of Russian citizens in the area. This is often 
seen by the inhabitants of Transnistria as a way out of a quite uncomfortable situation of 
being “the citizens of the TMR” only – a status providing no citizenship rights anywhere 
beyond the territory controlled by the Tiraspol regime, – or just keeping the old Soviet 
passports. As a result of Russian policies in the area, fully supported by the illegitimate 
Transnistrian authorities, over 100.000 Transnistrian residents have Russian citizenship. 
Nevertheless, despite facing numerous obstacles artificially imposed on them, 270.000 people 
(out of a total of about 550.000) have managed to realise their conscious choice of getting 
Moldovan citizenship, thus clearly signifying their willingness (and readiness) to rejoin the 
Republic of Moldova. 
The situation was further complicated by Ukraine, which over the last few years granted, 
according to different estimations, Ukrainian citizenship to between 50.000 and 60.000 ethnic 
Ukrainians residing in Transnistria area. Recent statements by some Ukrainian authorities 
may indicate that Ukraine intends to further encourage inhabitants of the Eastern districts of 
the Republic of Moldova, claiming Ukrainian ethnicity, to gain Ukrainian citizenship and to 
ease the existing procedure for this. 
 
Taking into consideration that Ukrainian legislation (the Constitution as well as the Law on 
Citizenship), in contrast to that of Moldova, but in accordance with that of the majority of 
European states, does not provide for dual or multiple citizenship, such steps will certainly 
create in the future essential obstacles to the participation of this part of the population of the 
Eastern Districts in public and political life of the reintegrated Republic of Moldova – in 
particular, by preventing them to be elected to representative bodies of power, join political 
parties, take part in referendums, etc.  
 
A significant part of Moldovans residing on the right bank of the Nistru River acquired 
Romanian citizenship, which is becoming increasingly appealing in view of Romania’s 
forthcoming entry into the EU. This fact can be regarded as contributing to the division 
between the population inhabiting, respectively, the Transnistrian region and the rest of the 
RM, and may influence the country’s prospect for reintegration. In addition, a prevalent 
European trend to limit citizenship to a single country and to make national legislations even 
more restrictive in this regard (as, for example, recent amendments to the citizenship law in 
Germany), should also be taken into consideration. 
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Although no simple solution can be immediately identified, we believe that regular 
consultations and coordination of citizenship policies between the governments of the 
Republic of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine (with the engagement, if possible, of Russia) 
would be welcome, with the objective to set a legal frame compliant with European 
standards. 
 
VI. The role of Russia in the common effort  
 
All three parties recognise that Russia is an important actor with the legitimate interests in the 
region. Russia could also make an important contribution to the solution of the conflict that 
would have an added value. 
 
At the same time its influence should be manifested through the means of negotiations, and 
the principle of Pacta sunt servanda is to be observed at all times. Therefore, we invite 
Russia to assume the principles agreed between the three parties, and to contribute to the 
solution offered by the present documents and according to the free and qualified will of the 
citizens of the Republic of Moldova living on the East Bank. 
 
Russia should comply with its commitments of the Istanbul 1999 OSCE final statement 
regarding the withdrawal of weapons and ammunition from the East bank, the retreat of its 
soldiers – guardians of ammunition stocks, peacekeepers, or its citizens acting as members of 
local militia, security and military illegitimate bodies. 
 
The democratisation of the separatist region and the path towards a functional democracy in 
the whole Republic of Moldova is a guarantee for the protection of all citizens living in the 
Eastern districts that will enjoy their rights according to European standards and regardless of 
their ethnic identity. The best proof for this is the very existence of the quite sizable Russian 
minority on the West Bank of Nistru that benefits from human rights observance on equal 
terms with other citizens of Moldova, and whose members are not discriminated in any way. 
 
The Russian language has a large circulation and there is no discrimination related to using 
this language on the streets and everywhere. There are no regulations to oblige the children to 
learn only in Moldovan, and on the contrary, all children learn also Russian as a foreign 
language. At the decision-making level, members of the Russian minority have a larger 
representation in all bodies than the quota of population they represent. 
 
Therefore, the three parties believe that there are no legitimate interests of Russia that cannot 
be resolved within the framework of just and friendly relations with the Republic of 
Moldova. 
 
Any claims put forward by Russia should be discussed and negotiated with the central 
authorities of the Republic of Moldova using proper bilateral mechanisms; there is no 
precedent when legitimate claims were rejected. 
 
On the other hand, Russia should rely on the legitimate authorities of the Republic of 
Moldova for dealing with the internal matters of the country, on the basis of its sovereignty 
recognised by Moscow as well as by all international community, also within the framework 
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of the bilateral interstate agreement ratified by both countries. In this respect, Russia should 
recognise the right of the Republic of Moldova to choose the best security solution and the 
best way of economic development for its citizens, including the will to adapt and reform the 
country in order to be able to join European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. 
 
It is very important for Russia, that officially recognises the borders and the sovereignty of 
Republic of Moldova, to support its legitimate authorities in their enseavours to take full 
responsibility for the entire country, and in particular, to reinsert central authorities 
representatives into the separatist region. According to the international agreement in force, 
Moscow should no longer attempt to promote the independence of Transnistria. 
 
Although Russia might be invited to take part in future peacekeeping multinational operation, 
it should also be taken into consideration that this country was recognised as the side of the 
Transnistrian conflict by the decision of the European Human Rights Court on the case 
“Ilascu and others versus Moldova and Russia” (8 July 2004). Russia observed this decision 
in the part concerning paying of the compensation to the liberated political prisoners 
previously kept in the Transnistrian prison. This fact may compromise further active 
engagement of Russia in the new peacekeeping operations or civil/military missions. 
 
The three parties agree that all the actors should look for a suitable and comprehensive 
package of stimulants and benefits clearly presented and explained to Russian leaders, to the 
establishment and to the population of the Russian Federation. This effort should be shared in 
order to ease the political costs of the assumed changes in Russia’s attitudes towards the 
region. Russian Federation should realise the advantages in terms of acquiring more 
credibility, added political weight and status among countries of the world by the gesture of 
support for the proposed solution for the Transnistria region, thus proving the new spirit of 
the Kremlin and demonstrating its openness, generosity and acceptance of the values shared 
by the international community. 
 
VII. The added value of further introducing of European 
standards 
 
All three parts agreed about the role of the democratisation and introducing more European 
standards within the Republic of Moldova. The added value of those processes could help to 
improve the situation and give a solid perspective of development and welfare to all the 
citizens of the Republic of Moldova. 
 
Since the society was never split along ethnical or religious lines, even in the time of the 
armed conflict, restoration of trust and rebuilding of the country is easier to achieve once the 
major sources of the conflict are eliminated. It is here the ground for the projects connected to 
the EU-Moldova Action Plan, the TACIS programmes and other special programmes 
financed by donors to provide the relief.  
 
We propose to establish a special fund for the reintegration and reconstruction of the Eastern 
districts, to finance projects of confidence building, civic education, inclusion and tolerance, 
also for re-structuring the main institutions of the separatist region. This programme should 
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by consistent with the existing EU-Moldova Action Plan in order to synchronize the 
development of the whole Republic of Moldova. 
 
The EU has a vast experience in state building. Since Democratisation and Europeanisation 
processes would greatly contribute to the solution to the conflict, therefore, we urge the UE to 
consider playing a more active role in Moldova, beginning with the transfer of expertise in 
the fields of border guards, border police and local police, also strengthening  of justice 
system, local administration, central institutions, etc.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
To the UN, OSCE, CoE and the EU 
• Elaborate a joint, clear-cut position reconfirming that any solution to the Transnistrian 
problem can only be based upon the recognition of, and full respect for, the Republic 
of Moldova’s state sovereignty and territorial integrity and that its Eastern 
(Transnistrian) region has no prospect of being recognised by the international 
community as an independent state.  
• Emphasise that if a decision is reached on the status of Kosovo, it is irrelevant to the 
case of Transnistria – irrespective of its form and content. 
 
 
 
 
 
To the EU 
• Reevaluate assessments and commitments in view of the risks and security threats that 
the ‘frozen’ conflict in Transnistria represents for the EU member states and the 
region as a whole. 
• Consider replacing the existing peacekeeping forces in Transnistria with a 
multinational EU or OSCE-led mission consisting of civil (police) and military 
personnel, using the experience gained by the EU missions deployed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
• Fully implement the mandate of the EU Border Assistance Mission with special 
emphasis on site inspections to be conducted without any kind of prior announcement. 
Consider extending the EU Border Assistance Mission mandate in order to monitor all 
illicit border trade according to international law and the bilateral Ukraine – Moldova 
Declaration signed by the two Prime Ministers on 30 December 2005. 
• Emphasise, from the public diplomacy point of view, not only the inspection part, but 
also the capacity-building aspect of the EU Border Assistance Mission in order to 
increase the popularity of the Mission, thus enhancing cooperation between the border 
guards and customs police personnel and gain the support of society as a whole. 
 
 
To the EU & US 
• Consider strengthening the EU and US role in the negotiation process, aimed at the 
further transformation of a “5 + 2” format into a fully-fledged format of “7”. 
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• Intensify political dialogue with Russia, persuading the latter to comply with 
international norms and standards concerning Transnistria issues. 
• Suspend trade relations with those economic agents of Transnistria that fail to comply 
with internationally recognised customs regulations and Moldovan legislation. 
• Reconfirm that ratification of the adopted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
Treaty be conditional upon the complete withdrawal of Russian troops and munitions 
from the RM.  
• Suggest to Ukraine that it coordinates its policy of dealing with high level 
representatives of the Transnistrian administration with the EU and the US, especially 
with regards to the ban on entering the US and EU member states. 
 
To all actors involved in the Transnistrian conflict settlement: 
• Take all possible measures to assist in enforcing the full observance of the ceasefire 
agreement between the RM and Russia of 21 July 1992 (signed in the presence of Igor 
Smirnov), especially the point concerning the unrestricted movement of people, goods 
and services in order to prevent and redress such incidents as, for example, blocking 
the pedestrian traffic on the Dubossary Hydro-Electric Power Plant dam for villagers 
on both banks of the Nistru River (31 January 2006), also to abolish the illegal border 
and customs controls imposed by the illegitimate Transnistrian authorities at the 
“internal border”. 
• Insist on denouncing any customs duties for Moldovan goods entering the territory 
of the Transnistrian region introduced unilaterally and illegally by the separatist 
authorities.   
 
 
 
To the OSCE 
• Provide further support for the Common Initiative of the Moldovan and Ukrainian 
Presidents concerning the creation of an OSCE Assessment Mission for the 
Transnistrian region in order to define appropriate criteria for democratic elections 
and for monitoring their observance. 
• Reсconfirm that the advanced democratisation of the region is a long-term process 
that should precede any internationally recognised elections.  
• Intensify collaboration with international experts and civil society actors for assessing 
progress in regional democratisation. 
• Continue the efforts aimed at completing the withdrawal of Russian troops and 
removal of munitions and equipment still stored in the Transnistrian region of the 
RM. 
• Until this objective is reached, ensure broader international support for carrying out 
regular unhindered inspections of Russian weapons and arsenals near Kolbasna 
station.  
• Develop, in collaboration with the EU, a detailed proposal on a civil/military mission 
to replace the existing peacekeeping forces (the Joint Peacekeeping Troops) that do 
not meet international (UNO) standards and are unable to cope with the situations of 
emergency. 
• Raise the question of the demilitarisation of the Eastern districts of the RM at the CFE 
Treaty states-parties conference within the framework of The Forum for Security 
Cooperation in May 2006. 
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To NATO: 
• Include the Transnistrian issue into the NATO-Russia policy dialogue agenda. 
• NATO Parliamentary Assembly: support and reconfirm the recent document signed 
by the foreign ministers of all 26 NATO member states, emphasising the need to 
resume and complete the withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment from the 
territory of Moldova as soon as possible. 
•  NATO Parliamentary Assembly: consider the relevance of the recent initiative on 
monitoring the withdrawal of Russian troops and ammunition from Georgia to the 
Moldova/Transnistria situation. 
  
To national and international donor & sponsor organizations: 
• Establish a clearinghouse for better coordination of programmes, projects, and 
planning of different forums in order to avoid duplication and sometimes even 
“rivalry” for partnership and cooperation with a still limited number of Transnistrian 
NGOs involved in democratisation and integration activities. 
• Focus on joint, re-integrative projects for the Republic of Moldova (including 
Transnistrian NGOs), instead of supporting those projects dealing separately with 
Transnistrian NGOs. 
• Encourage regional cooperation projects involving civil society actors from 
Moldova/Transnistria and a number of Central and Eastern European countries, 
especially those actively supporting the “Community of Democratic Choice” 
initiative, taking into particular account the experience accumulated on these matters 
by the Soros East-East Program.  
• Pay special attention to trilateral projects involving the Republic of Moldova and its 
two neighbouring countries – Ukraine and Romania – as the parties most committed 
to a successful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, and therefore willing and able 
to make an important contribution to strengthening regional cooperation in areas of 
security, human rights, ecology and other issues.  
• Support initiatives “from below” aimed at sharing the experience of contributing to 
the peaceful settlement of “frozen conflicts” and developed by independent experts 
and civil society activists from GUAM countries.  
 
To Romania: 
• Support the aspirations of both the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine for the 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration. 
• Continue efforts on the international level advocating the urgency of solving the 
Transnistrian problem, which threatens regional security and stability, on the basis of 
the RM state sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
• As a neighbouring country on the verge of EU membership, negotiate involvement in 
the EU Border Assistance Mission. 
• Consider providing border and customs management assistance and training, and 
sharing experience on implementing anti-corruption programmes, within the 
framework of activities of the EU Border Assistance Mission. 
• Coordinate its policy of providing Romanian citizenship to residents of the Republic 
of Moldova with the governments of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine according 
to European standards and keeping in mind the need for consolidating and 
strengthening Moldovan statehood and the prospect of that country’s reintegration.  
• Launch a public awareness campaign stressing the Republic of Moldova’s 
reintegration as the main objective and the eventual result of the resolution of the 
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Transnistrian conflict, thus dispelling the idea of decoupling the Transnistrian region 
from Moldova, advocated by some marginal Romanian political figures.  
 
To Ukraine: 
• Use the opportunity to strengthen Ukraine–EU cooperation by developing coordinated 
policies with regard to Transnistrian issues. 
• Ensure full-fledged collaboration with the EU Border Assistance Mission and a 
concerted effort to stop the trafficking of weapons, small arms, drugs, and people 
across the Ukraine-Moldova border, particularly its Transnistrian section, as well as 
the illicit flow of goods from Transnistria not licensed and registered according to RM 
rules and regulations. 
• Cease official bilateral relations with leaders of the “TMR” as they are not subjects of 
international relations, and reduce to an absolute minimum unofficial meetings and 
talks; make them transparent and subject to previous consultations with the RM 
authorities and the EU missions to Ukraine and Moldova. 
• Reconfirm that any solution to the Transnistrian problem should be based exclusively 
on the reintegration of the Republic of Moldova, and that the Transnistrian conflict 
resolution efforts would contribute to regional security and stability, and therefore 
correspond with the objectives of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan, Ukraine – NATO 
Action Plan and Ukraine – NATO Annual Target Plans.  
• Revise its policy of encouraging mass and unconditional acquisition of Ukrainian 
citizenship by residents of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova. 
• Encourage those ethnic Ukrainians who are residents of the Transnistrian region of 
the RM and have no intention of leaving the area, to gain Moldovan citizenship, at the 
same time providing them with support to satisfy their ethno-cultural needs in full 
compliance with European norms, standards and international treaties, to which both 
Ukraine and Moldova are signatories.  
• Implement without any further delay the bilateral Ukraine-Moldova DEclaration from 
30 December 2005 on the import/export of Transnistrian goods across the border, 
unilaterally suspended at noon on the day of its coming into force (January 25), and 
terminate commercial relations with firms and agents located on the territory of the 
Transnistrian region that fail to observe Moldova’s legislation and internationally 
recognised customs regulations.  
 
To Moldova: 
• Strengthen cooperation with the EU and NATO in order to promote domestic 
administrative, economic and political reforms. 
• Provide enterprises located in Transnistria with a practical and accessible framework 
for acquiring legal licenses for their activities. 
• Request a preferential visa regime with the EU that would have the added value of 
enhancing the attractiveness of Moldovan citizenship for residents of the Transnistrian 
region. 
• Develop a long-term strategy aimed at the consolidation of the entire citizenry of the 
Republic of Moldova into a modern political nation, while supporting and promoting 
ethno-cultural and religious identities, and observing the rights of minority groups.  
• Adopt as soon as possible legislative acts providing political, social and security 
guarantees to residents of the Transnistrian region within the reintegrated Republic of 
Moldova. 
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To Ukrainian & Moldovan authorities 
 
• Intensify closer bilateral cooperation between national legislatures and regional/local 
representative bodies. 
• Ensure better coordination of state policies aimed at European and Euro-Atlantic 
integration, engaging support and assistance from the new EU member states and 
candidate countries within the framework of the “Community of Democratic Choice”. 
• Ensure enforcement of bilateral intergovernmental agreements for a mutual, 
“symmetric” approach to observing the rights of national minorities according to 
European standards and the recommendations of the Venice Commission particularly 
with respect to the role of kin states; promote the engagement of civil societies in both 
countries, as well as NGOs from neighbouring states, into the monitoring and 
implementation of such agreements.  
 
To Russia: 
• Complete the withdrawal of troops and munitions from Moldova, in compliance with 
the 1999 Istanbul commitments. 
• Reconsider its policy of promoting unrestricted acquisition of Russian citizenship by 
residents of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova. 
• Abolish the practice of issuing licenses for goods produced in Transnistria by the 
Russian Chamber of Commerce.  
• Apply the same oil and gas prices for all regions of Moldova, including its eastern 
(Transnistrian) region, in a transparent way and in accordance with the WTO 
regulations.  
• Use its leading position and influence within the Eurasian space to ensure an eventual 
peaceful and sustainable solution to the Transnistrian problem. 
 
 
